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LAW AND THE FOG OF HEALTHCARE: COMPLEXITY AND 
UNCERTAINTY IN THE STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH POLICY 
PAUL STARR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In healthcare, as in any field of professional practice, uncertainty is an 
everyday fact of life. New research and information technology can reduce 
uncertainty insofar as its cause is limited knowledge, but scientific and 
technical advances cannot dispel uncertainties when they have another 
source: complex, variable, and opaque institutional arrangements that are 
ultimately political in origin. Compared to systems in the other major 
democracies, the American healthcare system stands out not only for its cost 
and inequities but also for its extraordinary complexity. That complexity — 
and the fog of uncertainty it creates for everyone involved in healthcare — is 
more than a nuisance; it is a problem with wide repercussions that deserves 
more analytical attention than it has thus far received. 
Complexity is not an inherently bad thing. Our computers, smartphones, 
and the Internet are complex, but they are relatively easy to use, and they 
make other things easier and cheaper. Complexity becomes a problem, 
however, when it adds to cost and difficulty without yielding compensating 
benefits. In healthcare, patients and providers alike face that kind of 
gratuitous complexity. The complexity has economic effects: the 
administrative costs of healthcare are far higher in the United States than in 
other countries with more unified or standardized systems of healthcare 
finance.1 The complexity also has a psychological impact: health insurance 
and the healthcare system are confusing and frustrating to many of the sick 
and their families, as well as to those who care for them. Not least of all, 
complexity has a political impact: health policy has become so intricate that 
proposals for change also seem too complicated to many people, lending 
plausibility to charges that “death panels” or other insidious schemes are 
 
* Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs and Stuart Professor of Communications and Public 
Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. 
 1. See, e.g., Uwe Reinhardt, Divide Et Impera: Protecting The Growth of Health Care 
Incomes (Costs), 21 HEALTH ECON. 41, 44 (2012); Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health 
Care Administration in the United States and Canada, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 768, 772 (2003). 
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secretly hidden inside them.2 In an era when American politics has become 
polarized on partisan and ideological lines, the fog of healthcare has 
become so thick as to make rational public discussion of health policy 
nearly impossible. 
The United States worked its way into this fog step by step. Instead of 
enacting a comprehensive system of healthcare finance, as did the other 
rich democracies of the world, Congress created different programs for 
different groups — veterans, the employed, the elderly, some of the poor. 
Each of these programs was based on its own distinctive principles, which 
run the gamut of the public-private spectrum. For veterans, there was a 
federally owned and operated health system; for seniors, a federal insurance 
plan with private supplemental insurance; for the categorically eligible poor, 
a mixed federal-state program; for workers with employer-provided 
coverage, a tax subsidy for private insurance. As health costs rose, 
employers and private insurers adopted a myriad of different plans and rules 
in a largely unsuccessful effort to keep costs down. For similar reasons, 
programs and rules multiplied in the public sector as well. Many of the 
complexities in those programs stem from legislative compromises struck in 
Congress, which were then overlaid with further compromises in later 
additions and revisions. Private markets, federalism, and legislative 
compromise have their virtues, but transparent and streamlined 
arrangements are not necessarily among them. Ironically, some of the most 
highly prized features of America’s political economy have produced one of 
the most reviled features of the American healthcare economy — its 
bewildering complexity. 
When people discuss the primary objectives of health policy, they do not 
usually mention reducing the fog that envelops the system. In Donald 
Berwick’s well-known formulation, for example, the “triple aim” of health 
policy should be “improving the experience of care, improving the health of 
populations, and reducing per capita costs of health care.”3 Reduced 
complexity would contribute to two of those objectives: an improved 
experience of care and lower costs. But escaping from the fog will not be 
easy. Many people are comfortable in it, some earn their living from it, and 
the shock of entering the daylight of a simpler system would probably cause 
many people to believe at first that they were worse off even if they were not. 
 
 2. PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH 
CARE REFORM 237 (2011) [hereinafter REMEDY]. 
 3. Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 
759, 759 (2008). 
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II.  THE FOG OF THE HEALTHCARE MARKET 
Consider first the fog that hangs thick and low in the healthcare market. 
The American healthcare system systematically obscures prices and costs. At 
crucial points of decision, most people have no idea of the true cost of their 
health insurance or healthcare. 
The employment-based insurance system can be counted as a success 
in this respect: it conceals costs from those who ultimately bear them. 
Economists agree that the cost of health insurance, including the share 
nominally paid by the employer, is borne by the worker, who would 
otherwise receive higher wages.4 But most employees with health benefits do 
not see it that way; they see it as a burden shouldered by their employer. 
Most do not even know the total cost of their insurance coverage; until this 
year, their W-2 did not show the employer’s contribution to their insurance.5 
Pay stubs typically list only the employees’ share, and their awareness of that 
amount is minimized because it is subtracted from their paychecks before 
they receive a dime. In addition, they do not see themselves as benefiting 
from a tax subsidy, although the exclusion of employer health insurance 
payments from taxable income is the third costliest federal health program 
(after Medicare and Medicaid).6 If Americans had to write a check every 
month to make a single lump-sum, after-tax payment for health insurance, 
the resistance to rising premiums would surely have been greater. 
Prices for medical services are also enveloped in fog. Hospitals and 
other healthcare providers do not post their prices, much less offer any way 
of comparing how expensive they are. Depending on a patient’s insurance 
coverage, providers charge different prices for the same service. Indeed, 
they regard prices charged to different insurers as a trade secret and often 
cannot give a simple, straight answer to a consumer’s questions about the 
price for a service at the time it is being provided. It is as if, when you drove 
up to a gas station, there were no signs indicating how much the fuel would 
cost, the station would charge you a different price depending on the type of 
car you were driving, and the attendant refused to tell you the price even 
while you were at the pump. 
The low visibility of prices for healthcare and insurance has been a 
major contributory factor in America’s high medical costs. As Uwe Reinhardt 
has shown, prices for the same service vary wildly within the United States, 
with the average sharply higher than in the other rich democracies. In 2010, 
 
 4. Lawrence Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. 
REV. 177, 178 (1989). 
 5. I.R.C. § 6051(a)(14) (2012). 
 6. Jonathan Gruber, The Tax Exclusion for Employer–Sponsored Health Insurance (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15766, 2010), available at http://www.nber. 
org/papers/w15766; see also REMEDY, supra note 2, at 75. 
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for example, private insurers in the United States paid from $6,379 to nearly 
$14,000 for a normal delivery, with an average price of $8,435 compared 
with $3,768 in France, $2,667 in Canada, and $2,147 in Germany.7 In a 
study conducted between May 2011 and July 2012, fewer than half of 
hospitals contacted could provide a price for a total hip replacement; 
among those that did, prices varied from $11,100 to $125,798.8 
Moreover, price appears to be unrelated to quality; there is no evidence, for 
example, that the U.S. hospitals that charge more for a given service deliver 
a correspondingly superior quality of care.9 Americans may believe that they 
get more and better healthcare by spending more money on it, but mainly 
they pay a higher price per service without evidence of corresponding 
benefits. 
To be sure, people know that healthcare is expensive, and especially if 
they are uninsured, the price of an initial visit to a physician may deter them 
from getting care. That may help explain why the annual number of 
physician visits among Americans aged 18 to 64 dropped from 4.8 to 3.9 
between 2001 and 2010, a period when the proportion in that age group 
without health insurance rose from 17% to 21.8% and an increased 
proportion of the insured faced higher cost-sharing.10 
Healthcare differs from other markets, however, in that the demand for 
services comes only in part from consumers. Once patients are in the midst 
of treatment, physicians and other providers make most of the decisions that 
determine how much that course of treatment costs. As a result, much of the 
demand is supplier-induced, especially for the most costly services. Unlike 
most other consumer spending, moreover, healthcare spending is highly 
concentrated among a small proportion of the population. In any given 
year, five percent of people typically account for about fifty percent of 
healthcare costs, while the top ten percent of people account for two-thirds 
of costs –– and most of this spending takes place above the deductibles 
even in high-deductible plans.11 But just as patients lack information about 
prices, so do physicians: it’s no part of their training, and they ordinarily 
 
 7. Reinhardt, supra note 1, at 46. 
 8. Jaime A. Rosenthal et al., Availability of Consumer Prices from US Hospitals for a 
Common Surgical Procedure, JAMA INTERNAL MED. (Feb. 11, 2013), http://archinte.jamanet 
work.com/article.aspx?articleid=1569848. 
 9. Reinhardt, supra note 1, at 46. 
 10. BRETT O’HARA & KYLE CASWELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH STATUS, HEALTH 
INSURANCE, AND MEDICAL SERVICES UTILIZATION: 2010, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.cen 
sus.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-133.pdf; Sabrina Tavernise, Doctor Visits Dropping, New 
Census Figures Show, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at A22. 
 11. NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., THE CONCENTRATION OF HEALTH CARE 
SPENDING 1, 2 (2012); Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care 
Expenditures, Revisited, 20 HEALTH AFF., March/April 2001, at 9, 12. 
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have no reason to take an interest in what hospitals, laboratories, or 
medical-device and pharmaceutical companies charge. 
Oscar Wilde defined a cynic as someone who knows “the price of 
everything and the value of nothing,”12 but in healthcare, that is too rosy a 
view. A true cynic would say that neither doctor nor patient knows the price 
or the value of treatment, though they had best be convinced of its value so 
as to benefit from a placebo effect. 
It is one of the ironies of the supposedly market-oriented American 
system that healthcare prices are much harder to discover in the United 
States than they are in many countries where prices for physicians’ services 
are negotiated annually, posted publicly, and easily available. In France, 
where the payment system is now electronic and nearly instantaneous, 
patients must nonetheless first pay their physician before receiving 
reimbursement.13 This system was adopted originally because the medical 
profession insisted that it continue to be paid directly by patients under the 
French insurance system, but it now serves as a way of maintaining public 
consciousness of prices.14 
In the 1970s, a healthcare system with all-payer rates, annually 
negotiated and publicly posted, was imaginable in the United States. But 
since the 1980s, it has seemed inconceivable because of political 
opposition to price regulation and because private insurers, Medicare, and 
Medicaid pay such different rates that any move to a uniform standard 
would cause enormous financial disruptions. But even if Democrats and 
Republicans cannot agree on all-payer rates, why not insist that healthcare 
facilities at least post a uniform set of prices for people not covered by 
Medicare and Medicaid? As Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg, two 
business school professors, point out: “The administrative complexity of 
dealing with multiple prices [for the same service] adds costs with no benefit. 
The dysfunctional competition that has been created by price discrimination 
far outweighs any short-term advantages individual system participants gain 
from it, even for those participants who currently enjoy the biggest 
discounts.”15 
Two possibilities suggest themselves. One would be to use Medicare’s 
relative values and let providers determine the multiple of Medicare rates 
that they prefer to charge. For example, one hospital might charge 
Medicare plus 25%, another Medicare plus 50%, enabling consumers to 
 
 12. OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE’S FAN act 3, sc. 1. 
 13. T. R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA 59 (2009). 
 14. Id. at 60–61; see also MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF 
MEDICINE 35 (2011) (confirming that direct payment by the patient to the physician has been a 
core principle of the French insurance system since its inception). 
 15. MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH O. TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE 66 (2006). 
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know instantly relative costs. A second possibility, without the use of 
Medicare’s relative values, would be to require providers to adopt one set of 
prices for all private payers and to post those prices online in a uniform 
format. In that case, entrepreneurs could develop websites and apps to 
enable consumers to figure out how much care at different facilities would 
cost. Just as guides indicate how much restaurants cost on a simple scale 
with dollar signs, so an overall index could, at a glance, show how a 
doctor’s or hospital’s prices stood in relation to others. Some health plans 
have begun to offer online resources to compare prices, though at this point 
they appear to be of little practical value.16 
Posted prices would be particularly helpful to the millions of people now 
moving into high-deductible plans. Advocates of the market want healthcare 
consumers to be more price-conscious, but how can they make price-
conscious decisions without any way of knowing what prices are? Even more 
than liberals, market-oriented conservatives should want to adopt 
requirements for price transparency. 
III.  THE FOG OF HEALTHCARE PROGRAMS 
Just as Americans have gotten used to the fog in the healthcare market 
as if it were normal for producers and consumers not to know the price of 
services, so they have gotten used to the fog that hangs over public 
programs for healthcare. The history of healthcare policy in the twentieth 
century is a story first of failure and then of piecemeal reform — the failure 
of general proposals for national health insurance, and the passage of 
piecemeal efforts to deal with the problems of groups that benefit from 
public sympathy and effective organization. The passage of these programs 
has often involved compromises of a particular kind. Compromise does not 
inherently lead to greater organizational complexity; for example, members 
of Congress may split the difference on the budget for an agency without 
complicating the agency’s structure. The adoption of major health 
programs, however, has involved ideological compromises between left and 
right that have resulted in complex structures with hybrid operating 
principles. The passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 and the 
 
 16. See Maribeth Shannon, Turning Consumers into Shoppers, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(October 18, 2012, 11:05 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/10/18/turning-consum 
ers-into-shoppers-using-high-deductible-plans-wisely/. Shannon touts United HealthCare as 
an example, but its pricing tool seems only to be an illustration of the idea, without the 
necessary data that would make it useful to consumers. Id. 
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adoption of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program in 1997 illustrate 
these patterns.17 
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid at the zenith of Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society is generally seen as a great victory of American 
liberalism, but the programs were compromised at their inception in ways 
that undermined their purposes and added to their complexity. The story has 
been told many times.18 In 1964, Lyndon Johnson and the Democrats won 
a landslide victory promising to enact a hospital insurance program for the 
elderly on the same basis as Social Security — that is, through a federal 
payroll tax. After the election, Republicans offered an alternative called 
“Bettercare,” a subsidized, voluntary insurance plan that would also cover 
physicians’ services, albeit through private insurers. As its alternative, the 
American Medical Association (AMA) proposed an expansion of existing 
federal grants to the states for healthcare of the elderly poor. Before the 
1964 election, the key obstacle to passing the Democrats’ hospital 
insurance program was the chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee Wilbur Mills. After Johnson’s landslide, however, and with the 
president’s encouragement, Mills not only agreed to go ahead with the 
hospital insurance plan but also added to it modified versions of the 
Republican and AMA proposals. The Democrats’ hospital insurance 
proposal became Medicare Part A, the Republican proposal to cover 
physicians’ bills became Medicare Part B, and the AMA proposal became 
Medicaid. 
The trouble with Mills’ three-layered cake was, first of all, that it had too 
much frosting on it; the desire to propitiate the doctors and hospitals led to 
absurdly generous provisions for paying them. Second, the legislation made 
healthcare finance much more complex. The other major democracies do 
not finance the healthcare of the elderly through a separate system, but the 
1965 legislation resulted in the establishment of four different systems to pay 
for seniors’ healthcare. Medicare’s two parts worked on different principles: 
Part A was financed by an earmarked tax, Part B by a combination of 
general revenues and premiums paid by seniors. Part A and Part B each had 
its own deductibles, copays, and other rules. In addition, as a result of 
Medicare’s limited benefit package, the majority of the elderly bought 
private supplemental insurance. Finally, Medicaid would cover seniors who 
 
 17. Medicare and Medicaid were established as a part of the Social Security Amendments 
of 1965. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was established as a part of 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 4901, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 552 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2006)) [hereinafter BBA]. 
 18. The following discussion of Medicare draws on my account in REMEDY, supra note 2, 
at 41-50; see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 363-378 
(1982). 
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had very low incomes or spent down their assets and ended up in a nursing 
home. 
Medicare itself had lower administrative costs than private insurance, 
primarily because the government didn’t do any marketing, medical 
underwriting, or even much questioning of claims — it just paid them. But 
like the multiplicity of private insurance plans for people under age 65, the 
multiplicity of government payment systems created under the 1965 
legislation inflicted an enormous paperwork burden on patients and families 
and required providers to hire legions of administrative personnel. Critics of 
a single system of national health insurance had said it would be a 
bureaucratic nightmare, but the more unified or standardized systems in 
other advanced countries have much less bureaucracy. It was political 
compromise in America that made healthcare in the United States a 
bureaucratic nightmare. 
Subsequent changes in Medicare have added to the complexity. Besides 
the four separate arrangements for paying for seniors’ healthcare, Congress 
created a fifth in 2003 when it added a prescription-drug plan (Medicare 
Part D) on a different basis from all the other parts.19 Passed under a 
Republican president by a Republican Congress, the program provides 
prescription-drug coverage entirely through private insurers, just as 
Republicans would originally have preferred for other medical coverage of 
seniors in 1965. Unlike other Medicare benefits, drug coverage has a 
unique, donut-hole structure; as originally passed, after a $250 deductible, 
the program covered 75% of costs up to $2,250, nothing for expenses 
between $2,250 and $5,100 — that’s the donut hole — and 95% of 
expenses above that level.20 Also unlike other benefits, the list of covered 
items (that is, drugs eligible for reimbursement) varies depending on the 
private insurer. These features may account for the reaction of seniors after 
the law was passed. A November 2004 survey found that by a margin of 
81% to 13%, seniors said the program was “too complicated.”21 In 
November 2006, after Part D went into effect, the proportion agreeing that 
it was “too complicated” was still 71%.22 
Confronted with an average of about 40 prescription-drug plans in their 
area, how well do the elderly do in choosing plans? Not so well, it turns out. 
 
 19. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-80 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 
(2011)). 
 20. Id. § 1860D-2(b)(1)-(3), (4)(B); see also Drew E. Altman, The New Medicare 
Prescription-Drug Legislation, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 7 (2004) (providing a succinct 
summary of the Medicare Part D donut-hole). 
 21. Elizabeth C. Hamel et al., Medicare and Medicaid, in AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND 
HEALTH CARE 187, 187 (Robert J. Blendon et al. eds., 2011). 
 22. Id. 
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A recent study from the National Bureau of Economic Research finds that 
fewer than ten percent of seniors choose a plan that would be the most cost-
effective for them — that is, the plan that would minimize their costs, given 
their drug usage.23 When faced with dozens of options, seniors tend to 
respond more to the premium than to the benefit package and consequently 
choose options with low premiums that do not provide them good coverage. 
Reporting on the first three years of Medicare Part D, the same researchers 
find that “variety in available levels of coverage has diminished sharply for 
individual buyers . . . . Offerings of plans with the most comprehensive 
coverage have collapsed, and plans with intermediate coverage are at risk 
of a death spiral of rising premiums and falling enrollment.”24 
The establishment of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program in 
1997 added another layer to government finance of healthcare.25 
Congressional passage of the program followed a familiar sequence.26 In 
the 1950s, after Democrats had failed to pass national health insurance 
under President Truman, they retreated to a proposal of a separate program 
for a sympathetic age group — seniors. Similarly, after the defeat of the 
Clinton health plan in 1994, Democrats retreated to another idea for a 
special program for a sympathetic age group — children. Already, during 
the 1980s, Democrats had been able to forge alliances with Republicans to 
extend Medicaid to low-income children and pregnant women.27 Continuing 
that process would have been simpler administratively than creating a 
separate program, but political compromise once again resulted in a new 
layer of finance. Republicans did not want to expand the federal entitlement 
to the poor, but some of them were willing to support a program with 
limited grants to the states for children’s coverage; indeed, they saw a new 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP, later CHIP when the 
program was renamed) as establishing a model that could eventually 
become a more fiscally limited alternative to Medicaid. As a result, the final, 
compromise legislation had a hybrid quality, offering states a fixed amount 
of money but with the option of using it for a separate CHIP program, an 
 
 23. Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative 
Data 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18166, 2012), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18166. 
 24. Id. at 3 n.3. 
 25. BBA § 4901; Jeanne M. Lambrew, The State Children’s Health Insurance Program: 
Past, Present, and Future 49 THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Feb. 9, 2007, at 1. 
 26. CMS, TRACING THE HISTORY OF CMS PROGRAMS: FROM PRESIDENT THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 2, available at http://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/ 
Agency-Information/History/downloads/presidentcmsmilestones.pdf. 
 27. REMEDY, supra note 2, at 70-71. 
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expansion of Medicaid or a combination of the two — without, however, 
putting the federal share on an entitlement basis.28 
These examples point to the underlying forces that have produced the 
exceptional levels of complexity in healthcare programs. America’s political 
institutions — the checks and balances in the Constitution, plus additional 
practices adopted by Congress — make the passage of large-scale reforms 
in any institutional sphere exceedingly difficult. In the case of healthcare, 
those obstacles were sufficient to block the adoption of national health 
insurance. For supporters of broadened insurance protection, the course of 
least resistance was to focus on specific, sympathetic groups in need and to 
use complex legislative compromises to build ideological and interest-group 
coalitions. I am not prepared to say that this was the wrong choice, given 
the political conditions. Thus far, however, the pattern has been to add layer 
upon layer to the financing system. Unfortunately, this same process has 
been evident in the recent history of efforts to achieve comprehensive 
reform. 
IV.  THE FOG OF COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 
The healthcare bill proposed by President Clinton in 1993 and the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) signed by President Obama in 2010 represent 
the two most ambitious recent efforts to achieve comprehensive reform of 
healthcare. In both cases, critics ridiculed the plans as too complicated. In 
1993, when he was a Republican, the late Senator Arlen Specter displayed 
an elaborate chart with a maze of boxes and connecting lines showing all 
the parts of the Clinton health plan, ostensibly proving that it was so 
complex as to be unworkable.29 Sixteen years later, opponents of 
“Obamacare” produced similar charts, though by that time Senator Specter 
was a Democrat and provided a crucial vote for the legislation.30 
No doubt healthcare legislation has become complicated, but 
complexity in law is not the same as complexity from the standpoint of the 
consumer. Computers, smartphones, and the Internet are again relevant 
comparisons. Not only are they technically complex; they also depend on 
complex laws regulating telecommunications, intellectual property, product 
liability, and other matters. But complex legal rules are often necessary to 
assure that our institutions and technologies work smoothly. 
 
 28. Id. at 141. 
 29. Ron Goldwyn, GOP Rolls Out Specter’s Chart to Attack Clinton Health Plan, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Jan. 28, 1994), http://articles.philly.com/1994-01-28/news/258252 
40_1_health-care-plan-chart-health-reform-plan. 
 30. Understanding the Obamacare Chart, JOINT ECON. COMM. REPUBLICANS (March 22, 
2012), http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=96b779aa-6d 
2e-4c41-a719-24e865cacf66. 
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To be sure, law should be no more complicated than the task requires. 
Critics of both the Clinton health plan and the ACA denounced them as 
“Rube Goldberg” contraptions.31 Goldberg was a sculptor and engineer 
who drew cartoons of intricate devices that performed simple tasks in 
convoluted ways. The implicit premise of the Rube Goldberg analogy was 
that healthcare reform was simple but made unnecessarily convoluted by the 
Democrats who concocted these proposals. But the legacies of the past rule 
out solutions that are simultaneously simple, effective, and popular. History 
cannot be unwound: the United States already has a legally complex 
healthcare system. If Senator Specter had displayed a chart of the existing 
system, it would also have had a maze of boxes and lines. Legislation 
cannot just erase all that accumulated law without causing severe 
repercussions. If we are going to improve the system — including measures 
that simplify it from the perspective of consumers and practitioners — we will 
have to do it through laws that carefully take existing complexities into 
account. 
At the beginning of the healthcare reform effort in 1993, just after Bill 
Clinton asked her to lead it, Hillary Clinton wanted to keep things simple. In 
one of my first conversations with her in the White House — after a Sunday 
afternoon meeting of the National Economic Council in the Roosevelt Room 
in early February 1993 — she mentioned that she had heard that the 
legislation in Canada establishing universal coverage had been just a few 
pages long and only set out general principles for the Canadian provinces. 
Her question had nothing to do with single-payer. Still new to health policy, 
she was hoping that we could somehow develop a short, simple bill with 
general principles for the states. In the end, of course, that is not what 
happened. 
But why couldn’t that have been the approach? Any responsible 
healthcare proposal, as I have just suggested, had to deal with interactions 
with existing programs and institutions. In addition, in the United States, a 
law that only set out general principles would probably be deemed 
unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, Congress would never pass such a law 
because it would effectively delegate so many critical decisions to the 
executive branch and the courts, and so vague a bill would die for lack of 
support from groups in both the industry and the public that would demand 
specific language to protect their interests. 
The intricacies of the Clinton health plan also reflected its ambitions. 
Legislation that just aims to cut federal spending need not be that 
 
 31. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Clinton’s Health Plan: Principles; Experts’ Grades: ‘A’ in 
Security, ‘C’ in Simplicity, ‘D+’ in Savings, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1993), http://www.nytimes. 
com/1993/09/24/us/clinton-s-health-plan-principles-experts-grades-security-c-simplicity-d-
savings.html (describing Clinton’s healthcare plan as “a fragile Rube Goldberg contraption”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
224 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:213 
complicated, but legislation that aims both to achieve universal coverage 
and to control national health expenditures (public and private) will 
necessarily deal with a wide range of issues. The Clinton plan also 
epitomized the tendency I mentioned earlier: it was a prime example of 
ideological compromise. It sought to discipline spending, as Clinton himself 
said in a campaign speech in September 1992, through “competition within 
a budget” — that is, a system of private health plans, competing under an 
overall, global budget for healthcare.32 That system required the 
establishment of a new institution that the Clinton plan called a “regional 
health alliance.” Like the insurance exchanges created under the ACA, the 
alliances were to offer coverage through private insurers. Unlike the 
exchanges, they were to offer coverage to nearly the entire population in a 
region under age 65, with the rate of increase in the average premium 
regulated by a federally set global budget.33 
I argued then, and I still believe, that the Clinton plan would have 
substantially simplified the health system from the standpoint of consumers. 
The proposal called for the alliances to offer three types of insurance 
coverage — traditional fee-for-service, preferred provider plans, and HMOs 
— each with standardized benefits and cost-sharing.34 Enrollment, claims 
forms, and many other aspects of the system would also have been 
standardized. The basic idea was to maintain competition among private 
health plans, but to do it in a more structured environment that reduced 
complexity and administrative overhead and increased the salience of price 
comparisons. The Clinton plan would have substantially consolidated 
programs and plans. Medicaid beneficiaries would have received coverage 
through the alliances, the number of employer plans would have been 
radically reduced, and there never would have been any need for a 
separate children’s health insurance program. 
From the beginning, however, the Clinton plan was pilloried for its 
complexity, partly as a result of the administration’s own ineptitude. The first 
announcement of the plan came through the unauthorized release in early 
September 1993 of a technical outline, without any explanation in plain 
English. As I note in my recent book, “When architects release plans for a 
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building, they ordinarily present an artist’s rendering or a physical model to 
the public. The Clinton White House released its health plan in the form of 
engineering specifications. The impression that the proposal was impossibly 
complicated was firmly established at that moment.”35 
Moreover, the core ideas of the Clinton plan were unfamiliar, and 
unfamiliarity is often mistaken for complexity. The plan’s hybrid approach, 
“competition within a budget,” was a new idea. So was the concept of a 
regional health alliance. Those of us involved in the Clinton effort hoped to 
win over conservatives by preserving private insurance and competition and 
to win over liberals by achieving universal coverage and capping the growth 
of healthcare costs. Instead, right and left focused on the aspect of the 
proposal they hated, the healthcare industry was terrified by the prospect of 
global budgets, and many people were just confused. 
Reflecting lessons learned from the early 1990s, the ACA is less 
ambitious than the Clinton plan. It includes no cap on the growth of 
insurance premiums or any other global budgeting mechanism. Instead of 
establishing insurance exchanges for the entire population under age 65, 
the law leaves in place all existing employment-based insurance, Medicaid, 
and CHIP and sets up the exchanges only for the individual and small-group 
markets, with voluntary enrollment.36 During the 2008 campaign, trying to 
reassure people with good private coverage that they had nothing to lose 
from reform, first Hillary Clinton and then Barack Obama had used the 
same line: “If you like your insurance, you can keep it.” But that reassurance 
meant preserving most of the complexity and administrative cost in the 
existing system. This is one of the contradictions of health politics: Reforms 
that seem simpler because they maintain existing forms of coverage also 
maintain more complexity. 
Obama also benefited from the 16 years that elapsed from Clinton’s 
proposal. By 2008, there was a working example of an insurance exchange 
in Massachusetts, so it was no longer a hypothetical idea. In addition, the 
development of online communication and business showed how an 
exchange could be organized cheaply and efficiently. In 1993, a regional 
health alliance was denounced as another bureaucracy; today, people can 
envision the insurance exchange as a website — an Expedia for health 
insurance. 
The ACA contains a variety of measures specifically aimed at simplifying 
healthcare from the standpoint of consumers. The single most popular 
provision in the law has been the requirement for insurers to publish easy-to-
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understand benefit summaries. According to a November 2011 Kaiser poll, 
that provision receives the support of 88% of Democrats, 87% of 
Independents, and 76% of Republicans.37 Under the law, the Department of 
Health and Human Services is also developing online resources for 
Medicare beneficiaries to compare the quality and cost of hospitals and 
physicians.38 In addition, by 2015 states are supposed to provide a single 
entry point for people applying for coverage through the new insurance 
exchanges, Medicaid, or CHIP, instead of burdening individuals with 
figuring out where they should apply.39 Online gateways can streamline 
eligibility determination, enrollment, and many other aspects of health 
insurance. 
But the new insurance exchanges and affordability subsidies will 
represent yet another separate layer of healthcare finance, with complicated 
provisions regarding the subsidies, individual mandate, penalties for certain 
employers not offering qualified insurance, and other matters. Among the 
many uncertainties in implementation, two stand out as particularly 
troubling. The first concerns the insurance exchanges; the second concerns 
the Medicaid program. 
The insurance exchanges are supposed to facilitate consumer choices 
among health plans. For example, they are to offer plans in four tiers, 
arranged according to actuarial value, from bronze plans at 60% actuarial 
value (which means consumers would pay an average of 40% of costs out 
of pocket) to silver plans at 70%, gold plans at 80%, and platinum plans at 
90%.40 But whether the exchanges clear away the fog or create more of it 
for consumers will depend on how states carry out the legislation — in 
particular, whether they act merely as clearinghouses, listing any and all 
plans insurers offer, or as selective bargainers, using their group-buying 
power as leverage to get the best deals for consumers and then framing the 
choices in a comprehensible way. 
Studies in behavioral economics have repeatedly shown that offering 
consumers more options does not necessarily enable them to make choices 
in their own best interest. For example, in 401(k) plans, when employees 
face a large number of choices, they are often so bewildered that they make 
no choice at all and leave employee matching funds on the table — a 
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decision clearly not in their interest.41 More generally, public policy 
inevitably faces choices about what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call 
“choice architecture” — that is, how to present choices to consumers, 
preferably in a way that recognizes cognitive limitations and enables people 
to make decisions that reflect their own interests.42 
If a state establishes its exchange as a clearinghouse with a minimum of 
regulation, insurers will predictably structure their benefits, marketing, and 
other aspects of their business to sign up healthy, low-risk subscribers and 
avoid the sick. If allowed to do so, however, they will defeat the objective of 
spreading costs fairly and prevent the market from rewarding plans that 
provide good healthcare at a low cost. A plan that is wasteful and inefficient 
in its provision of healthcare may nonetheless be cheaper because it avoids 
high-risk enrollees, while a plan that provides good care efficiently but 
suffers from adverse selection may be driven out of business. Under the 
ACA, measures such as risk-adjusted payment to plans and standardized 
benefit packages are supposed to combat this tendency, but they are 
unlikely to be sufficient without active management of the market by the 
exchange and state regulation of coverage offered outside it. In Medicare 
Part D, adverse selection has undermined plans with broad coverage.43 
There is a distinct danger that the insurance exchanges will repeat this 
experience, creating a market in which more comprehensive plans 
disappear. Historically, the employer-based system has concealed the true 
cost of insurance, reducing sensitivity to costs and allowing the system to 
become inordinately expensive. But exactly the opposite process may unfold 
in the exchanges, where plans with more comprehensive coverage may be 
killed by adverse selection, leading to a race to the bottom. 
As a result of the Supreme Court decision in NFIB v. Sebelius,44 the 
implementation of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is now even more 
uncertain than the implementation of the exchanges. If a state does not 
establish an exchange, the law at least gives the federal government back-
up authority to establish one.45 But if a state does not carry out the 
expansion of Medicaid, there is no back-up federal authority to cover 
people with the lowest incomes. Until the Court’s decision, a state could 
choose whether or not to establish a Medicaid program, but once it did so, 
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it had to comply with all the rules for the program set by Congress.46 Now 
there are, in effect, two Medicaid programs: 1) the program as expanded 
and amended until 2010, which is still an all-or-nothing choice for the 
states; and 2) the new program created under the ACA, which states may 
decide to accept or reject independently. According to the administration’s 
interpretation, states cannot pick and choose which people to cover among 
the newly eligible,47 but a state that proceeds with the 2010 expansion of 
Medicaid can later reverse the decision and cut off eligibility for the new 
beneficiaries. The split between Medicaid I and Medicaid II promises to 
create legal complexities and conflict for years to come. 
The Court’s decision creates uncertainties not only about Medicaid’s 
future but also about other proposals, such as raising the Medicare 
eligibility age to 67. Before the Court’s decision, it appeared that low-
income 65 and 66-year olds would at least have Medicaid to fall back on, 
but that can no longer be assumed. 
President Obama’s reelection has probably resolved whether the ACA 
will be carried out. But the deep ideological disagreements between the two 
major parties and among the justices of the Supreme Court ensure a 
continuing struggle over health policy that will continue to yield ambiguous 
and conflicting policies. There is no technical defogging equipment 
available to clear the air and make the healthcare system transparent. The 
root of the problem lies in our history. After a long period of adding layers 
to the financing system, we need a new era of consolidation and 
simplification, preferably on the basis of principles of fairness and 
transparency. If a solution lies in our future, however, it will not come about 
simply or easily, but only after wrenching political change. 
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